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BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16941 
This is an action commenced by plaintiffs for spe-
cific performance of two land sale contracts entered into with 
the defendants or, in the alternative, for damages for breach 
of two real estate contracts entered into by the plaintiff, 
Dick Bastian, and Gary Carson. At the time of the trial, 
plaintiff, Phillip Taylor, was joined as a party of plaintiff 
on stipulated record (Rec. 259:1-27, Rec. 94-95). During the 
trial, the claim for specific performance of the contracts was 
withdrawn by the plaintiffs on stipulation with the defendants 
and the plaintiffs proceeded upon their claim for damages fo~ 
breach of the two real estate contracts. Subsequent to the 
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execution of the earnest money receipts and offers to purchase 
and the acceptance by the defendants, the parties entered into 
an amended agreement to the contracts (Rec. 359-360) and agreed 
to a closing date of February 17, 1978 at Rocky Mountain Title 
Co. in Orem, Utah (Rec. 362). The parties met for the closing 
of the transaction. The closing never took place and plaintiffs 
brought this action for damages. 
DISPOSITIQN IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried without a jury on the 27th and 
28th days of -August, 1979 and the 8th day of November, 1979 
before the Honorable Don V. Tibbs. On the 6th day of February, 
1980, the trial court made Findings and entered Judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants for the sum 
of $35,000.00, together with eight percent (8%) interest per 
annum with no award for attorney's fees or costs to either 
party. The plaintiffs appeal the decision of the trial court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the Supreme Court rule that 
on the Findings made by the trial court and on the undisputed 
facts, plaintiffs are entitled to entry of judgment in the 
amount of $291,586.40, attorney's fees in the amount of 
$9,478.00 and costs on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cedar Hills Development Company is a partnership 
comprised of Near East Technological Services, Limited, a 
-2-
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California corporation, and Associated Industrial Developers, 
a California corporation, all parties being defendants. 
Reed Nixon, Robert Nixon and Mark Nixon are agents 
of Cedar Hills Development Company in the development of the 
Cedar Hills properties. They also have their own corporation 
called Wincor Development Company, a Utah corporation. 
William A. Malis and George C. Drivas are agents 
for Cedar Hills Development Company (Rec. 278:16-22; 306:16-21). 
Dick E. Bastian is a real estate developer. Gary 
Carson is a real estate contractor and developer. 
Prior to suit, Phillip Taylor became a party to the 
transactions by purchasing a part of the interest of Dick 
Bastian and all of the interest of Noall Tanner. Dick Bastian 
purchased the interest of Gary Carson prior to trial. Phillip 
Taylor was joined as a party plaintiff at time of trial, having 
acquired an interest in the properties (Rec. 259:1-9). 
Gary Carson was dismissed out as a party plaintiff 
during the trial. At trial, Dick E. Bastian and Phillip 
Taylor held all buyers' interests. 
Cedar Hills Development Company and its predecessor 
in interest, Associated Industrial Developers, Inc. had com-
menced development of the Cedar Hills property prior to the 
formation and the incorporation of the Town of Cedar Hills. 
Sewage lagoons had been constructed to meet health department 
requirements on the property of Cedar Hills Development Company. 
-3-
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Thereafter, the town was formed with Robert Nixon, one of the 
agents given power of attorney by Cedar Hills Development 
Company, becoming its first mayor. Richard LaFrance, the sales 
agent working for Global Enterprises and Associates, became one 
of the councilman on the initial town council. At the time of 
the formation of the town, the area of the Cedar Hills Develop-
ment Company property, which included the sewage lagoons con-
structed by the private company, were not annexed into the 
town and were not transferred eith by ownership, control, or 
by lease to the town. The testimony of the attorney, Brian 
Harrison, attorney for Gedar Hills, shows that the lagoons 
belonged to and were the private property of the Cedar Hills 
Development Company (Rec. 423:27-30). The town had prepared 
a lease of the lagoon property to put control within the town 
but no lease had ever been signed (Rec. 424:5-22). The town 
had made demands upon the development company to transfer 
ownership or control of the lagoons but the lease has never 
been signed to the time of trial, nor has any transfer been 
made of the ownership or operation of the lagoons (Rec. 424:23-30; 
425) and the company refuses to execute the lease (Rec. 425:1-11). 
On November 15, 1977, Dick E. Bastian and Gary L. 
Carson entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase for the purchase of 105 acres of development ground 
from Cedar Hills Development Company (Rec. 288, Ex. 9) for a 
purchase price of $1,417,500.00 and upon the execution of the 
earnest money receipt and of fer to purchase made payments of 
-~-
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$25,000.00 upon the purchase price. The payment was delivered 
to Global Enterprises and Associates, the sellers realty 
agent. 
On November 16, 1977, Dick E. Bastian and Gary L. 
Carson entered into another Earnest Money Receipt and Offer 
to Purchase from Cedar Hills Development Company for the pur-
chase of 37.75 acres of development land in Plat ''C" of Cedar 
Hills for the purchase price of-$517,175.00 and made payment 
upon said purchase in the ~um of $10,000.00 (Rec. 289:20-29, 
Ex. 10). The earnest money was again delivered to Global 
Enterprises and Associates. 
On November 23, William Malis, acting in behalf of 
Cedar Hills Development Company, sent a demand letter to Global 
Enterprises and Associates for delivery of the $35,000.00 
earnest money deposits and the demand letter alluded to the 
fact that there were contingencies that were not met. Cedar 
Hills Development Company then committed the indemnification 
of Global Enterprises and Associates, the realty company, re-
garding the payment of the funds on over to Cedar Hills Develop-
ment Company (Ex. 12). Upon demand, the real estate broker 
delivered the $35,000.00 to the agents of Cedar Hills Develop-
ment Company, S. Reed Nixon, Mark Nixon and Robert Nixon, who 
had been appointed agents for the development of the property, 
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit. Their authority 
was recorded in the Utah County Recorder's Office and is shown 
as Exhibit 5 in the Record. (Rec. 285:7-15, testimony of Mr. Malis) 
-5-
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The Earnest Money Receipts and Offer to Purchase 
were contingent upon the parties cooperatively obtaining the 
annexation of the property into the Town of Cedar Hills and 
approval of the preliminary plat. Annexation was accomplished 
in December of 1977 and the preliminary plat approval was ob-
tained on January 4, 1978 (Rec. 358:3-5). The Earnest Money 
Agreement and Of fer to Purchase for the 105 acres provided that 
30 days after annexation buyers would pay an additional $175,000.00 
and upon such payment sellers would release and provide good 
and marketable title tq 13 acres to the buyers. The contract 
further provided that the sellers would provide sufficient 
culinary water supply and use of the sewage lagoons for 30 
homes. The balance of the payments under the contract would 
be in accordance with the written agreement. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Off er to Purchase for 
the 37.75 acres in Plat "C" provided that buyers would pay 
$40,000 within 30 days of annexation and approval of the pre-
liminary plat. It further provided that sellers would provide 
sufficient culinary water supply and the use of the sewage 
lagoon system for 12 homes. It also provided that upon pay-
ment of the $40,000.00 sellers were to provide title to 3 acres 
and release the remaining acreage upon payment of the balance 
of the contract price according to its terms (Ex. 10). 
Sometime in January or February of 1978, the parties 
entered into an Amendment Agreement (Ex. 14), and set February 
-6-
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17, 1978 as the closing date for the payment of the amounts 
due at that time and the delivery of title to the 13 acres and 
3 acres, respectively (Rec. 362:11-22, 348:18-24; 509:18-25). 
The contracts and Amendment Agreement required the 
sellers to provide the transfer of certain shares of Manila 
Water Company stock to the Town of Cedar Hills, to provide a 
sufficient amount of water to the Town of Cedar Hills and to 
insure the development of the buyers project for the entire 
142.75 acres being conveyed. The Amendment Agreement further 
provided that Cedar Hills Development Company would dedicate 
to the Town of Cedar Hills an access to the property being 
released at the time of the first release and payment of the 
$215,000.00 under both contracts, so as to insure access to 
the buyers for the first properties that they were going to 
develop. At closing, the contracts also required conveyance 
of good and marketable title to the 16 acres at the same time 
as the payment of the $215,000.00. 
Between the approval of the preliminary plat and the 
closing, the parties discovered that the State Health Department 
had put a limit on the amount of connections that could be made 
to the defendants' sewage lagoons and that the lagoons had not 
been transferred to the Town of Cedar Hills. Defendants, 
through their agent, George Drivas, and plaintiffs met at the 
office of Rocky Mountain Title Company on February 17, 1978 
for the ostensible purpose of closing the transaction, con-
veying the 13 and 3 acres, respectively, and making payment 
-7-
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of the $175,000.00 and $40,000.00, respectively. At the time of 
closing, plaintif£s discovered that the defendants did not 
have title to the properties to be conveyed, had mortgages 
upon the properties, had not transferred the culinary water to 
the town 0£ Cedar Hills as required by the Amendment Agreement 
and were not in the position to close. At closing, no documents 
were prepared for the conveyance of the 13 and 3 acres, res-
pectively, or for the release of the underlying obligations 
owed by the defendants. 
At the time of the closing meeting, a dispute 
arose over sewa0e hookups. The plaintiffs demanded the defen-
dants give approval to the use of the sewage lagoons for 30 and 
12 hookups, respectively (Rec. 548:18-27). The defendants 
previously assured the plaintiffs that such would be provided, 
but at the time of the closing, refused to sign authorization 
for the use of the sewage lagoons. 
At the time of the closing meeting, the sales agent, 
Richard LaFrance acting for the sellers on the project, arrived 
at the closing meeting with a letter from the State Health 
Department authorizing the increase in the number of the 
sewage lagoon hookups sufficient to meet the needs of the 
plaintiffs herein (Ex. 15). Despite such authorization, the 
defendants' agent, George C. Drivas, refused to give the 
authorization for the use of the sewage lagoons. 
At the time of the closing, the defendants were not 
prepared nor ready to deliver a good and marketable title to 
-8-
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the premises required to be delivered at the time of closing. 
The plaintiffs had the funds available to make the 
payments due, amounting to $215,000.00, as required under the 
Earnest Money Receipts and Off er to Purchase and Amendment 
Agreement. The defendants did not convey water rights to the 
town as required by the Amendment Agreement (Ex. 15) nor de-
liver title to 16 acres as required by the contracts. The 
plaintiffs did not tender the money to the defendants because 
the defendants were not in· the position to deliver the neces-
sary title to the plaintiffs. Even if the plaintiffs had 
tendered the amount.required, because of title defects, lack of 
title in the defendants and encumbrances on the properties, 
plaintiffs could not have obtained that for which they had 
contracted. 
The realtor attempted to get the parties together 
for an additional closing and to get the matter resolved (Ex. 27). 
The plaintiffs attempted to enter into a compromise regarding 
the 42 hookups to the sewage lagoon and to set an additional 
closing meeting within 10 days and offered their full per-
formance of the contracts. (Ex. 42) 
At the time of the closing meeting, the evidence 
showed that the buyers had in excess of $400,000.00 on hand, 
which was more than was needed to meet the $215,000.00 in 
payments under the contract. 
At the time of the closing date of February 17, 1978 
the property had an appraised value of $2,212,000.00, the 
purchase price to plaintiffs was $1,934,675.00, and the dif-
-9-
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ference between market and purchase price was $277,325.00. 
The plaintiffs had paid $35,000.00 to the defendants as earnest 
money (Rec. 560:21-26). They had paid engineering costs of 
$11,761.40 (Rec. 555:6-19) and had paid an annexation fee of 
$2,500.00 (Rec. 563:8-13). The parties stipulated that if 
either party was entitled to attorney's fees that $9,478.00 
costs would be a reasonable amount. (Rec. 648:7-15) 
All representations of the sellers to the buyers up 
to the closing meeting were made through their agents, the 
realtors. The realtors drafted all agreements except for the 
Amendment Agr·eement dr!=:tfted by William A. Malis, the agent 
and attorney of the defendants, Cedar Hills Development 
Company. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE NOT READY, WILLING AND ABLE TO COMPLETE THE TRANSACTION 
AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AGREEMENTS 
The contracts between the parties are comprised of: 
(a) Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase dated 11/15/77, (Ex. 9, Rec. 289:7-9) 
for purchase of 105 acres. 
{b) Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Pur-
chase dated 11/16/77, for the purchase of 
37.75 acres (Ex. 10, Rec. 290:19-21). 
(c) Amendment Agreement applying to both 
Earnest Money Receipts, undated (Ex. 14, 
Rec. 3 00: 8-1 O) • 
(d) The oral agreement fixing the closing date 
for payment of the $175,000.00 (Ex. 9) and 
$40,000.00 (Ex. 10) set for February 17, 1978 
-10-
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at Rocky Mountain Title Company (Rec. 541:5-10; 
397:9-20; 417:3-18). 
A careful analysis of the component parts of the 
contracts shows that the buyers were required under the 
contracts and as a condition of the purchase: 
(a) To obtain annexation of the ~roperties 
into the town of Cedar Hills. 
(b) To obtain preliminary plat approval on 
the development within 90 days of the execution 
of the agreement. Annexation was accomplished 
in December, 1977 by the buyers (_Rec. 331:6-8; 
Ex. 3, testimony of Reed Nixon) and the pre-
liminary plat approval was obtained on January 
4 , 19 7 8 (Ex . 14 and 41 ) . 
(c) Payment of $175,000.00 on Exhibit 9 and 
$40,600.00 on Exhibit 10 at time of closing. 
(d) Payment of installments pursuant to the 
tenns of the Amendment Agreement commencing 
October 4, 1978. 
The contracts required of the sellers: 
(a) Sufficient culinary water for the entire 
project, acreage of 142.75 acres. 
(b) Use of the lagoon systems for 30 homes 
(Ex. 9) and for 12 homes {Ex. 10). Use of 
lagoon system was to be furnished at the time 
of the closing. 
(c) Conveyance of clear title to 13 acres at 
time of the payment of the $175,000.00 on 
Exhibit 9. 
(d) Conveyance of clear title to 3 acres from 
the property covered by Exhibit 10 to be con-
veyed at the time of the payment of $40,000.00. 
{e) Transfer of the shares of water in Manila 
Water Company to the town of Cedar Hills pur-
suant to paragraph 1 of the Amendment Agreement 
to the earnest money agreements (Ex. 14). 
Dedication to the town of Cedar Hills of 
certain real property for necessary access to 
-11-
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buyers' first release pursuant to paragraph 3 
of the Amendment Agreement (Ex. 14). 
(f) Good and marketable title to the 16 acres 
to be conveyed at time of closing. 
In the Findings entered by the trial court, the trial 
court held in Finding No. 1 that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
defendants were ready, willing and able to complete the trans-
action as provided in the Option Agreements and Amendment. 
A careful examination of the trial court's Findings indicates 
the only alleged failure on t~e part of the plaintiffs was the 
failure to tender the $215,000.00 required to be paid at the 
closing as agreed in the contracts. 
The trial court found in Finding No. 4 that plaintiffs 
had the funds to make the payment but failed to tender such 
payment. 
In Finding No. 6, the trial court held that the 
defendants were not in a position to deliver the necessary 
title to the plaintiffs even if the plaintiffs had tendered 
the amounts required. 
The trial court made no Findings of any failure on 
the part of the plaintiffs of their performance on the contracts 
except for the failure to tender the monies they had available 
at the time of the meeting set by the parties at Rocky Mountain 
Title Company for the closing of the transaction. The trial 
court was in error in ruling that such failure to tender was a 
breach of contract by plaintiffs because Finding No. 6 makes 
it obvious that tender was a useless act, when the trial court 
held, "Defendant was not in position to deliver the necessary 
-12-
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titles to the plaintiff" (Rec. 108). Defendants were not in a 
position to close the transaction because of defects in title 
and sellers' lack of preparedness to close. This Court has 
consistently held that a trial court should not require the 
parties to do a useless act. However, aside froJn the obvious 
inconsistency in holding that the plaintiffs had defaulted 
under the contract for failure to make a tender, and then 
also holding that even if the tender had been made that the 
defendants were not in a position to deliver title, the trial 
court has ignored the decision of this Court in Huck vs. Hayes, 
560 P.2d 1124 (1977~. 
The facts in Huck vs. Hayes are remarkably similar 
to the facts in the case now b~fore the Court. In that case, 
the contract required the defendant to furnish good and market-
able title with the title insurance policy in the plaintiff's 
name. The day before the closing set by the parties, the 
preliminary title report showed that the property was in the 
name of Kirschbaum and not Hayes, the seller. It showed that 
there was a federal tax lien against the property and also 
made exceptions for two previous warranties for failure to 
state marital status or disclose what interest the defendant 
had in the property. A closing date was set by the parties 
for March 8, 1974. The Court found that on that date the 
plaintiff-buyer had sufficient funds to make the payment 
required by the agreement. It further found that the buyers 
did not offer to make the payment. There was a period of 
-13-
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time when the realtor was trying to get the parties together 
for closing and then the defendant-seller took the position 
that because the buyers had not made payment required by the 
contract on the closing date, the seller had no further obli-
gations under the contract. Those statements of fact in Huck 
vs. Hayes are almost identical to the facts present in the 
case now before the Court. The parties entered into two 
earnest money contracts (Exs. 9 and 10), subsequently amended 
by an Amendment Agreement (Ex. 14), and then set a closing 
date by oral agreement for February 17, 1978 at the offices 
of Rocky Mouritain Title (Rec. 348:18-25). The evidence is 
undisputed and the trial court held that at closing the plain-
tiffs had the funds to make the payment of $215,000.00 required 
to be paid under the two agreements ($175,000.00 under Ex. 9 
and $40,000.00 under Ex. 10). This Supreme Court speaking in 
Huck vs. Hayes pointed out that under the contract it was the 
defendant-seller's responsibility to furnish good title to the 
property to be conveyed and a title insurance policy evidenced 
in such title. This Court held in Huck vs. Hayes that such 
obligation was a condition precedent to the seller's right to 
demand payment from the purchaser where the Court said: 
Inasmuch as under the contract the defendant's 
r~sponsibility to furnish good title and a 
title insurance policy, the furnishing thereof 
was a condition precedent to his right to de-
mand payment from the purchaser. 
It is fundamental that a party to a contract 
should obtain no advantage for the fact that 
-14-
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he is himself unable to perform. Since the 
defendant had not come forth with the agreed 
title insurance policy demonstrating that he 
could convey a clear and marketable title as 
of the proposed closing date, March 8, 1974, 
he could neither demand payment by the plain-
tiff on that date, nor claim that the latter was 
in default for failing to make the payment. 
(Emphasis Added) 
In the present case, the title report on the 105 
acres (Ex. 17), being purchased under Exhibit 9, shows that 
Cedar Hills Development Company had title only to the south 
approximately 660 feet of said property and title to the 
remaining portion is in the name of Keith Wagstaff. The 
title report, further shows the following clouds on the 
title on the 105 acres: 
(a) Sale to Utah County for taxes for the 
year of 1976, item 2. 
(b) Sale to Utah County for taxes for the 
year 1976, item 3. 
(c) An easement for a concrete ditch across 
the property, item 5. 
(d) An easement for a concrete ditch, item 6. 
(e) An overlap on part of the property by 
virtue of a deed in the name of George Dale 
Burgess and Ann Burgess, item 7. 
(£) A Judgment in favor of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah against Cedar Hills 
Development Company, item 9. 
(g) An unrecorded Uniform Real Estate Con-
tract between Keith Wagstaff as seller and 
Doyle Barrett and c. Dale Murdock as buyers, 
item 10. 
(h) Unrecorded Real Estate Contract between 
Cedar Hills Investment Group as sellers and 
-15-
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Associated Industrial Developers as buyers, 
item 11. 
The title report on the 37.75 acres (Ex. 18), 
being purchased under Exhibit 10, shows that the Federal Land 
Bank holds an undivided one-half interest in all minerals, 
Jay Ezra Adams and Effie W. Adams hold title to the South 
1,110 feet, and Cedar Hills Development holds title to the 
remainder. The title report further shows the following 
clouds on the title: 
(a) Sale to Utah County for taxes for the 
year 1977, item 2. 
(b) Sale to Utah County for taxes for the 
year 1976, item 3. 
(c) An overlapping description and a deed to 
James D. Harvey and Barbara S. Harvey as to an 
overlap of the property, item 5. 
(d) A Deed of Trust by Associated Industrial 
Developers to Zions First National Bank in the 
amount of $225,000.00, item 6. 
(e) A Deed of Trust by Cedar Hills Development 
Company to Prudential Federal Savings and Loan 
dated December 28, 1977 (after the execution 
of the agreement with the plaintiffs herein) 
in the amount of $1,457,334.00, item 7. 
(f) A Judgment in favor of the State Tax 
Commission of Utah against Cedar Hills Develop-
ment Company in the amount of $227.75, item 8. 
(g) An unrecorded Real Estate Contract between 
Jay Ezra Adams and Effie w. Adams as sellers, 
and Doyle Barrett and C. Dale Murdock as 
buyers, item 9. 
(h) The interest of Effie W. Adams, Trustee 
of the Effie W. Adams Family Trust Agreement 
by reason of a Quit Claim Deed dated December 
12, 1977, item 12. 
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~i) The property is subject to right of 
ingress and egress at all times for purpose 
of mining, milling or extracting minerals 
from the land, item 13. 
The contracts entered into between the parties made 
no exclusions or exceptions for other than conveyance of fee 
simple absolute title to the buyers, title to be delivered 
in accordance with the release provisions of the agreements 
as payments were made. Buyers had made payment of $25,000.00 
on the 105 acres and $10,000.00 on the 37.75 acres as earnest 
money (Rec. 435:17-20; 436:26-28). Sellers made demand upon 
the realtors and received the $35,000.00 on November 23, 1977 
(Rec. 292:2-10; Ex.· 12). 
At the time of closing, the buyers were to have 
paid $175,000.00 on the 105 acres and $40,000.00 on the 37.75 
acres, constituting $215,000.00 and, at that time were to 
have obtained the fee simple absolute title, evidenced by a 
policy of title insurance, on 13 acres out of the 105 acres 
and 3 acres out of the 37.75 acres. 
The testimony of Douglas Church, president of the 
title company, and Exhibits 17 and 18, shows that at the time 
of the proposed closing the defendants did not have clear 
title to the property and could not produce clear title for 
the closing (Rec. 551:8-11, 21-25; 512:11-22; 513:18-28; 
514:6-21; 515:17-28; 516:5-8; 517:5-15; 554:8-9, 18-30; 573:3-8}. 
There was no deed prepared as required by the con-
tracts for the conveyance to the plaintiffs at the time of the 
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closing of the 13 acres and the 3 acres, respectively (Rec. 
515:16-28). 
There was no release of mortgage from Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan nor Zions First National Bank. The 
company president attempted to secure documents to clear the 
encumbrances but was unsuccessful. 
Q. You said you contacted on your own the 
lending institutions relative to obtaining 
a release as to their deeds of trust. What 
response did you get from them? 
A. Most of the feed back from then was of a 
vague nature. I received some information 
from one of the ladies in Salt Lake at 
·Prudential; however, I received very little 
satisfaction in the fact that we would be 
getting a partial reconveyance of those. 
Q. Now, when you say you got very little 
satisfaction, what do you mean? 
A. I mean she indicated the amount, the 
approximate amount but stated that she was 
not sure whether they could be reconveyed 
and she would refer me to -- I can't 
remember his name, either one of the other 
fellows in the office, and so forth and 
basically just a run around is what I 
picked up. (Rec. 516:9-25) 
The defendants themselves admitted that they had no deed pre-
pared to convey title to the buyers as required by the contract 
on the 13 and 3 acres, respectively; had obtained no release 
of mortgage and did not have title to the property (Rec. 
687:30; 688:1-7), testimony of Mr. Nixon: 
Q. Were you able at that time to convey title 
by Warranty Deed? 
A. No. 
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Q. Why not? 
A. Because of the underlying obligations and 
mortgages on the property. 
Q. Did you have title? 
A. No. (Rec. 687:30 to 688:7) 
The Amended Agreement, paragraph No. 1, required 
that the sellers transfer water rights to the City. The 
testimony of the agent for Cedar Hills Investment and Land 
Company, Reed Nixon, the testimony of Mr. Malis and the testi-
many of Mr. Church, the title company representative, all 
established that they did not and could not get the water 
certificates until ~he underlying indebtedness of the seller, 
Cedar Hills Investment and Land Company, upon all of the 
properties had been paid. (Rec. 683:17-27; 684:22-27) 
The sellers could not deliver one-half (1/2) of the 
mineral rights on the 37.75 acres, although the contract 
called for conveyance of clear title to the property. The 
title report shows that as to the 37.75 acres, the Federal 
Land Bank had an undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the 
mineral rights in the property. There is no testimony that 
sellers had any ability to or any contract for the securing of 
said mineral rights. Defendants could not deliver those 
mineral rights and without the mineral rights, the plaintiffs 
could not secure FHA financing on the houses to be constructed 
on the property (Rec. 511:16-23; 574:3-8; 612:5-29). 
The Amendment Agreement required that the sellers 
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dedicate to the City "certain real property for necessary 
access to Buyer's first release" on which preliminary plat 
approval had been obtained. Such transfer had not taken 
place and, at the time of closing, no documents were presented 
to dedicate said property to the City to provide the buyers 
with access to the property. 
The Earnest Money Contracts required the sellers to 
provide the buyers with 42 hookups to the lagoon system owned 
by the sellers. The testimony is consistent through all 
witnesses that the buyers were intending to build 42 homes on 
the first released property to be conveyed at the time of 
closing. They had a bank commitment.for the construction 
of said homes on condition that water and sewer connections 
were provided. The contracts required the hookups. The 
frustration of the intended closing meetings was primarily 
caused by the refusal or inability of the sellers to deliver 
the 42 hookups. (Rec. 517:25-28; 548:18-27) 
The defendants tried to excuse such failure to de-
liver the hookups, claiming such right belonged to the Town of 
Cedar Hills, and have maintained that they were willing to 
deliver "all that they could" in the way of hookups, but that 
they did not have the power to deliver the hookups nor the 
mineral rights. This contention of defendants is untenable 
since the defendants owned the lagoons and had refused to 
transfer them to the town or even sign a lease on them (Testi-
mony of Brian Harrison, Rec. 424:23-30). However, in Smith vs. 
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~' (1977) 564 P.2d 771 the sellers, arguing against a 
claim for damages for breach of the sellers agreeing to deliver 
title, urged upon the Court that the Utah Court should accept 
a good faith-bad faith distinction and that only out-of-pocket 
loss should be awarded in cases of a good faith breach. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that the rule followed by Utah in 
a breach of contract by the vendor is that damages are to be 
awarded for the breach of contract for the sale of the real 
estate regardless of the good faith of or ina~ility to deliver 
what was contracted to be delivered by the party in breach. 
The Court ·reversed,. requiring the trial court to make a deter-
mination of the damages consistent with that opinion without 
regard to the good faith-bad faith concept. 
Thus, even if the seller, Cedar Hills Investment and 
Land Company, was unable to deliver the 42 hookups as it had 
contracted to do, unable to deliver the mineral rights as 
it had contracted to do, unable to deliver water right, 
or unable to convey title, their good faith or inability 
to be able to perform does not furnish any release from its 
responsibility to do so and its obligation to pay damages 
for failing to do so. Under the contract the sellers were to 
furnish sufficient culinary water for the entire acreage and 
the 42 hookups (30 hookups for the 105 acres and 12 hookups 
for the 37 acres). Defendants now maintain that they could 
not deliver the water shares until such time as the entire 
contract by which they were purchasing the land had been pai~ 
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off and the underlying indebtedness owed by Cedar Hills Invest-
ment and Land Company to the people from whom they purchased 
the property had been paid. They say this inability should 
relieve them of the responsibility to deliver what was required 
by the contracts and specifically provided by the Amendment 
Agreement (Ex. 14) drafted by the seller, Mr. Malis. As 
pointed out in Smith vs. Warr, supra, good faith of the 
sellers does not give any relief from the responsibility and 
the obligation to pay damages· for failing to do so. 
It is significant in this matter that the sellers, 
having the obligation under the contract to deliver clear 
title, release of mortgages, transfer of water rights and the 
hookups for the sewer, provided no documentation sufficient to 
carry out a closing at the time that Mr. Drivas came for the 
purported purpose of closing. Sellers' failure is strongly 
pointed out in the testimony of Doug Church, the president of the 
title company, who indicated in his testimony as follows: 
Q. Now, on the date of the closing, the 
scheduled closing, did you have the necessary 
documents in your possession to conduct the 
closing? 
A. I did not have all of the -- I could not 
adequately pass title at that time. There 
would need to be some exceptions that would 
affect the title that needed to be cleared 
up before that could be done . 
. . . title report which showed the Federal 
Land Bank of Berkeley actually as a half -- as 
being a fee title holder of one half of the 
mineral rights and Jay Ezra Adams and Effie 
W. Adams had a fee interest in a portion 
of the property. 
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Q. Would that mean, as you view it, the 
south 1,110 feet was still titled in the 
Adams? 
A. Yes, according to the chain of title, yes, 
that's correct. 
Q. Were you provided, in preparation for the 
closing, were you provided with any documents 
to clear up the title problems in connection 
with that 37.75 acres? 
A. No, sir, I was not. 
Q. Were you given any instructions to procure 
any releases of Deeds of Trust or transfers by 
deeds to clear up the title problems? 
A. No, sir, I was not ... 
Q. Did you have sufficient instruments in 
your possession on February 17, 1978 on which 
you could have made a closing and conveyance 
of title and the issuance of a title policy 
on those thirteen and three acres, respectively? 
A. Not completely, no, sir. 
Q. Were any documents given to you or the 
rJeans by which you could have obtained these 
documents to give a clear title on those 
acreages? 
A. Not at that time. (Rec. 511:5-25; 512:11-14; 
514:14-21; 515:29-30; 516:1-8) 
The evidence clearly shows that the defendants were 
in default under the contract, did not and were not able to 
provide what they contracted to deliver at a time set for closing 
by the parties, and the buyers, plaintiffs herein, were 
ready, willing and able to close the transaction as contracted. 
The ruling of the Court in Huck vs. Hayes, supra, 
sets the guideline for the trial court. It was error for the 
trial court to hold the plaintiffs' failure to make an actual 
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tender of the monies they had in preparation for the closing 
(Rec. 554:26-30; 555:1-28) was a breach of the agreement. 
In fact, the parties had made an offer in writing 
to close the matter and make the payment which was $215,000.00 
even after the intended closing date. On February 23, 1978, 
plaintiffs' counsel attempted to negotiate a resolution of the 
problem of the 42 hookups to the lagoon system and in the last 
paragraph in£ormed the defendants that plaintiffs were ready 
to close and prepared to close the matter within 10 days {Ex. 42). 
Under 78-27-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a written 
of fer to clos~ the mat~er and make the payment by the plain-
tiffs is equivalent to an actual tender of money. Under these 
circumstances, the trial court erred in failing to hold that 
the plaintiffs were ready, willing and able to perform under 
the contract. The trial court should have ruled that defen-
dants alone were in breach of the agreements. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES AWARDED 
PLAINTIFFS. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED .IN FAILING TO AWARD 
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAINTIFFS 
In the decision entered by the trial court, the 
plaintiffs were awarded judgment against the defendants for 
$35,000.00 with interest at the rate of eight percent (8%) per 
annum. No attorney's fees or costs were awarded to either 
party. In entering the judgment, the trial court failed to 
follow the Utah law with regard to measure of damages for 
breach by the sellers of the land sale contract. The circumstance 
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now before the Court is that the vendee was ready, willing 
and able to perform and appeared at the closing prepared to 
close the transaction. The vendor had: 
(a) made no preparations for the closing, 
(b) had not provided a clear title to the 
title company to be conveyed at closing, 
(c) could not provide a policy of title 
insurance showing clear title, 
(d) had no provisions for release of encum-
brances, 
(e) had no documents for conveyance of the 
property to be conveyed at the time of the 
closing, 
(f) "failed to transfer the water rights to 
town, and 
(g) failed to dedicate the property to the 
town to provide access to the subject pro-
perty to be conveyed by the sellers to the 
buyers. 
Under such circumstances, this Court has spoken very clearly 
as to the measure of damages to be applied by the trial court. 
In 1959 in the case of Andreasen vs. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 370, 
335 P.2d 404 (1959), the Court in discussing the measure of 
damages for breach of a land sale contract said at page 373: 
The proper measure of damages would be 
the difference between the defendant's 
offer and the actual market value of 
the property. 
However, that issue was more specifically dealt with in 1962 
in Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 579 (1962) where 
the Court said at page 88: 
The measure of damages where the vendor 
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has breached a land sale contract is the 
market value of the property at the 
time of the breach less the contract 
price to the vendee. . . {.Emphasis Added) 
The Court further said: 
Where a rule of law has been established 
for the measurement of damages, it must 
be followed by the finder of fact, and to 
recover damages plaintiff must prove not 
only that she has suffered a loss, but must 
also prove the extent and the amount thereof. 
Furthermore, to warrant a recovery based 
on the value of the property there must be 
proof of its value or evidence of such facts 
as will warrant a finding of value with 
reasonable certainty. Id. at 88. 
The evidence presented in Bunnell v. Bills, supra, was the 
plaintiff's opinion-as to the value of the property. The case 
was then affirmed as to that part of the decision finding 
that the parties had entered into a binding contract and that 
the defaulting vendor became liable in damages for the breach. 
It was reversed and submitted back to the trial court to 
have further hearing to determine the market value of the 
property. 
In the case now before the Court, plaintiffs pre-
sented their evidence as to the market value of the property 
at the time of the breach on February 17, 1978 and to that 
end, plaintiffs called as a witness Steven Charles Blankenship, 
a real estate appraiser. Counsel for the defendants stipulated 
to Mr. Blankenship's qualifications as a qualified appraiser 
(Rec. 631) where counsel said at lines 6-9: 
Mr. Wilson: Excuse me if I may interrupt. 
I am personally acquainted with Mr. Blanken-
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ship and I will stipulate he is qualified 
as an appraiser and I have used him on 
several occasions if that will save time. 
The property, both the 105 acres and the 37.75 acres, were 
appraised using two methods of appraisal, the market data 
approach and the development cost approach (Rec. 631:19-22). 
Mr. Blankenship appraised the property at $15,500.00 per 
acres on the date of the breach using the market data approach, 
and a value of $15,600.00 per acre using the development cost 
approach. The appraiser then testified that the value of the 
property using the lower of the two appraisal methods was, at 
the time of the breach of February 17, 1978, $2,212,000.00 
(Rec. 637:14-18). The purchase price of the two properties 
combined was $1,934,675.00 (Exs. 9 and 10, Rec. 638:18-22). 
The difference between the purchase price to the plaintiffs 
for the property and the market value on the date of the 
breach was $277,325.00. No rebuttal evidence as to such 
value was presented by defendants and in fact, the testimony 
of Mr. Blankenship was corroborated by Mr. Reed Nixon, a witness 
called by the defendants. In his testimony regarding pro-
perties sold by the defendants, Mr. Nixon was asked by his 
own counsel: 
Q. What was the sales price and what was the 
sales price at which those lots were to be 
sold to Mr. Jensen? 
A. Twelve Five. 
Q. Twelve Thousand Five Hundred per lot? 
\, \ 
A. Yes. 
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Recross-examination, question by Mr. Jeffs of Mr. Nixon: 
Q. Mr. Nixon, that is the figure that Mr. 
Blankenship used in his appraisal, was it not? 
A. That is correct. 
710:20-29; 711:2-5) 
(Rec. 705:24-JO; 706:1-16; 
The testimony of the defendants' own witnesses of 
actual sales corroborated the figures used by the appraiser 
in determining the value of the property on the date of the 
breach of contract. 
In 1977, in the cas~ of Smith vs. Warr, 56A P.2d 
771 (1977), the Court said at page 772: 
The measure of damages where the vendor has 
breached a land sale contract is the market 
value of the property at the time of the 
breach less the contract price to the vendee. 
The rule followed by Utah is that benefit-
of-the-bargain damages are to be awarded 
for breach of contract for the sale of real 
estate, regardless of the good faith of the 
party in breach. We therefore reverse, and 
remand to the District Court for a determina-
tion of damages consistent with this opinion, 
for an award of reasonable attorney's fees 
as required by the contract, and for costs 
below in the discretion of the Court. . . 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court's denial of plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees 
of $9,478.00 (stipulated as to amount, Rec. 648:7-15) was in 
accordance with Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, and Smith vs. Warr, 
supra. The trial court should have awarded as the benefit-of-
the-bargain to the vendees, the difference between market 
value and the buyers' purchase price of $277,325.00, and in 
addition the plaintiffs should have been reimbursed the $35,00Q.00 
paid upon the contract and the attorney's fees in the amount 
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of $9,478.00. In Smith vs. Warr, supra, the vendor contended 
that because they were unable to deliver what they had con-
tracted to deliver, the Court should adopt a good faith-bad 
faith rule and that the District Court should have awarded to 
the buyers only their out-of-pocket losses. The Court specifi-
cally rejected the sellers' contention that benefit-of-the-bargain 
damages have only been awarded in Utah when the breach was in 
bad faith. The Court said that that contention is not well 
founded and cited Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, in support thereof. 
It went on to say at page 722: 
[T]he rule followed by Utah is that benefit-of-
the-bargain damages are to be awarded for 
breach of contract for sale of real estate, 
regardless of the good faith of the party 
in breach. 
The Court reversed the trial court decision, and ordered it 
remanded to the District Court for the determination of the 
damages consistent with the rule on the measure of damages 
for loss of bargain and for an award of reasonable attorney's 
fees as required by the contract. In 1978, this Court again 
in Beckstrom vs. Beckstrom, 578 P.2d 520 at page 523 restated 
the entitlement of the vendee to the market value of the 
property less the amount the vendee agreed to pay for the 
property. The Court again cited Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, 
Smith vs. Warr, supra, and Andreasen vs. Hansen, supra, in 
support of such measure of damages. 
In addition to their loss of bargain, the plaintiffs 
have suffered their expenses incurred as a result of entering 
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into the contract and the subsequent breach of the agreements 
by the defendants. Those items of damages are uncontested and 
include: 
(a) $35, 000 .,QQ paid upon the earnest money 
contracts (Rec. 560:21-26) which money was 
obtained from the real,estate brokers by demand 
of the defendants within a few days after the 
earnest money contracts were signed. (Ex. 12). 
(b) The engineering costs expended on the 
project of $11,761.40 (Rec. 555:6-19, the 
undisputed and unrefuted testimony of Dick 
Bastian). 
(c) $2,500.00 paid as an annexation fee 
to the town of Cedar Hills to annex the 
defendants property into the town (Rec. 563:8-13). 
(d) Attorney's fees of $9,478.00 (stipulation 
of counsel, Rec. 648:7-15). 
Plaintiffs further submitted testimony to the trial 
court as to the time and effort spent by Mr. Bastian and Mr. 
Taylor in the furtherance of this project. Plaintiffs-appellants 
acknowledge that such expenses could be properly excluded by 
the trial court. However, the loss of bargain defendants paid 
under the contract, out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the 
plaintiffs as a result of entering into the contract and the 
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs were not discretionary with 
the trial court. The trial court having determined that 
defendants were unable to convey a correct title or deliver 
that which they contracted to deliver, plaintiffs-appellants 
were entitled as a matter of right to be awarded such damages. 
The proved, established and unrebutted evidence discloses 
that plaintiffs were entitled to an award of damages: 
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(a) Benefit-of-the-bargain $277,325.00 
(b) Payment on contract 35,000.00 
( c) Out-of-pocket expenses 11,761.40 
(d) Attorney's fees 9,478.00 
The trial court misapplied the Utah law .in failing 
to award plaintiffs damages in said amount of $33~,564.40. 
The trial court, apparently concluding both parties 
were in default, attempted to avoid an inequity by not allowing 
defendants to retain the $35,000.00 paid upon the earnest 
money contracts. This, however, was not an equity case. It was 
a suit for· damages ~rom the time that the parties stipulated 
that the plaintiffs might withdraw their specific performance, 
it being obvious that sellers could not convey title and de-
liver that which was contracted for. From that point on it 
was an action at law for damages for breach of contract and 
the trial court was required by the decision of Smith vs. Warr, 
supra, and Bunnell vs. Bills, supra, upon a showing of the 
value of the property by competent evidence, to make an award 
for the loss of bargain. The Court should also have made an 
award for reimbursement of the monies paid under the contract, 
attorney's fees provided by the contracts and an award to the 
plaintiffs for their out-of-pocket expenses as a result of 
entering into the contracts and the subsequent breach by the 
defendants. 
Based upon the evidence now in and before the Court, 
this Court should make the appropriate award for damages as 
delineated herein. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE REQUIREMENTS 
FOR FURNISHING OF SEWER HOOKUPS WAS WAIVED 
Plaintiffs entered into the purchase agreement for 
142.75 acres of property for the purpose of developing the 
same as residential building lots. The fact that it was 
purchased for development is evidenced by the contracts them-
selves, which provided that the contracts were contingent upon 
the securing of approval of the annexation of the town of 
Cedar Hills and plat approval within 90 days. Those Exhibits 
are in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. The 
purchasers, as developers of the property, would have to 
provide, in order to go forward with the development, culinary 
water and sewage hookups in order to be able to build the 
homes as is shown by the testimony of Mr. Bastian (Rec. 573) 
wherein the question was asked (beginning at line 12): 
Q. Mr. Bastian, why were you so insistent at 
the time of the projected closing of having a 
letter corrunitting the forty two hookups from 
Cedar Hills Development Company? 
A. Without sewer hookups or any water hookups, 
we could not get, No. 1, plat approval No. 2, 
loan corrunitment; No. 3, could not transfer 
title to any of the lots I hoped to develop. 
Without the culinary water and the sewer hookups, the buyers 
were not receiving what they had contracted to purchase. They 
were not given clear title to the property, and they were not 
getting the water and sewer hookups which were a necessary and 
fundamental part of the purchase agreement. The land without 
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the capability of development was useless to them and did not 
warrant the purchase price in excess of $13,500.00 per acre. 
These requirements for water and sewer hookups were not waived 
as shown by the evidence presented to the trial cour~a letter 
from the seller's real estate agents to sellers indicating in 
paragraph No. 4 that the development company needed to provide 
a letter authorizing the use of the 42 hookups from the lagoon 
system owned by the development company to authorize the 
buyers to go forward with the project. (Ex. 13) On the date 
of the closing, the realty agent, Richard LaFrance, obtained 
authorization from the Division of Health for increased commit-
ment for the lagoons owned by the development company sufficient 
to include the additional 42 hookups required by the buyers 
and which were an integral part of the contract (Ex. 15). 
The authorization requested in the closing meeting, which 
would have met that requirement under the contract, was 
never given. Mr. Bastian testified: 
Q. Now, going forward to the conference.for 
closing purposes, will you tell us what you 
said, what Mr. Carson or Taylor said, and Mr. 
Drivas said relative to the same subject mat-
ter, the hookups the water and the conveyance 
of title? (Mr. Jeffs) 
A. In the conversation and in previous written 
documents we had aqreed to accept the existing 
water shares that the sellers now owned in the 
amount of one hundred and twenty-three shares, 
I believe, to be dedicated to Cedar Hills to 
give them the bargaining power in obtaining 
water for our subdivision in the future; that 
it was imperative that we have forty-two of the 
sewer hookups that have already been promised 
set aside and dedicated to this plan so we could 
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get F.H.A. approval and develop the subdivision. 
Also, mention was made of the title to the 
thirty seven acres to the effect that part of 
the mineral rights had been deeded off and 
without the mineral rights, F.H.A. would not 
give lending or approval. 
Q. What did Mr. Drivas respond to those matters? 
A. I don't recall. I don't know that that's 
become an issue. The main issue was the water 
shares and the sewer hookups. (Rec. 553: 12-30; 
554:1-9) 
The agreement on the sewer hookups had not been waived, as 
is demonstrated by Mr. Bastian's testimony. 
Q. Do you know the reason why the closing did 
not go forward on the 17th? 
A. It Wasn't ready to close. The things, the 
personal and real property that I had contracted 
to buy were not in evidence and no vehicle had 
been provided for their forthcoming. 
Q. What do you mean by "no vehicle was provided 
for their forthcoming"? 
A. The sewer hookups, no documentation either 
from Cedar Hills or from the owners allowing 
me to use them on the forty-two lots that I 
had contracted to use them on. No water shares 
were in evidence or forthcoming to be dedicated 
to Cedar Hills City to allow me to obtain the 
additional water connections that I needed. I 
had contracted for both of these, real and per-
sonal property. (Rec. 554:10-24) 
On February 10, after the Amendment Agreement was written, Mr. 
McNeilly, acting in behalf of the selling agents, Global Enter-
prises, wrote to Mr. Reed Nixon, the agent of Cedar Hills 
Development Company (Ex. 20), requesting the authorizations 
of the hookups and suggesting that if they could obtain the 
authorization from the town of Cedar Hills and the Department 
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of Health officials this would meet the buyers' requirements. 
Despite such requests in writing by sellers' own 
agent and the fact that the selling agent, Mr. Richard LaFrance, 
produced at the closing meeting the authorization from the State 
Health Department for the increased use of the lagoons, never-
theless, Mr. Drivas, an agent sent by the sellers to attend 
the closing, refused to provide the authorization for the use 
of the hookups. The testimony of Mr. Bastian shows that no 
waiver was given: 
Q. And I don't want you to give me all two 
hours of discussion, but can you tell me those 
things that Mr. Drivas said relative to going 
forth with the closing? 
A. I wanted a guarantee that I would get 
my 42 sewer hookups. Mr. Drivas said, 'I 
can't give you what I do not have. What I 
have, I give to you.' 
Q. Thereafter at the meeting was Mr. Drivas 
asked to sign an instrument or to give a letter 
committing those hookups? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What was his response to that request? 
A. That it wasn't within his power to do so, 
that that would have to come from the City of 
Cedar Hills. (Rec. 548:14-27) 
In this particular situation, the sewage lagoons in 
use by the town were owned by the development company, the 
sellers in this matter; the town had been making considerable 
efforts to gain a lease or conveyance of the sewage lagoons 
so that it might have control of them; the sellers had com-
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mitted to deliver 42 hookups to the lagoons as a part of the 
property being purchased; and the defendants-sellers come to 
the closing meeting to obtain their $215,000.00 without any 
preparations for the closing and refused to give their 
authorization to the use of their lagoons. In the face 
of such testimony and behavior, it is an incorrect ruling by 
the trial court that the plaintiffs waived their right to re-
ceive the 42 sewer lagoon hookups as an integral part of this 
purchase. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT EB.RED IN NOT ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST 
ASSOCIATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPERS, INC. AND NEAR EAST 
TECHNOLOGICAL SERVICES, LIMITED, INC. 
In this matter, plaintiffs brought the suit against 
Cedar Hills Development Company, which company has subsequently 
changed its name to Cedar Hills Land and Investment Company, 
(statement of defense counsel Rec. 660:8-30; 661:1-16), 
Associated Industrial Developers, a California corporation, 
Near East Technological Services, Limited, a California 
corporation, William A. Malis and George C. Drivas. At the 
close of the plaintiffs case, the trial court dismissed 
William A. Malis and George C. Drivas from the action (Rec. 
651:18-28) and dismissed Wincor Developrrle-nt (Rec. 652:3-4). 
Cedar Hills Development Company is a partnership, its principal 
officer is William A. Malis (Rec. 277:7-11) and its partners 
are Associated Industrial Developers and Near East Technological 
Services, Inc. (Rec. 277:16-19, Rec. 277:28-30, Rec. 278:6-19, 
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Rec. 278:27-30, Rec. 279:1). 
In determining that Cedar Hills Development Company, 
now Cedar Hills Land and Investment Company, partnership was 
liable, the Court should have a.lso entered judgment against 
Associated Industrial Developers, Inc. and Near East Technolo-
gical Services, Limited, Inc., the corporate partners in 
Cedar Hills Development Company and the principals obligated 
for the debts incurred in the name of the partnership. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court correctly ruled that the defendants 
could not clos.e _the . transaction or deliver that which they had 
contracted to deliver, i.e. good title free of encumbrances 
on a release schedule provided by the parties agreement. The 
trial court further correctly ruled that the plaintiffs had 
the ability and the funds available for the closing. 
Based upon the trial court's misassumption that the 
technicality of tender made both parties equally at fault in 
the transaction, the trial court incorrectly ruled that plain-
tiffs were only entitled to a refund of the $35,000.00 earnest 
money they had paid upon these contracts. 
This Court should now apply its previous pronounce-
ments .of the measure of damages. It should make the determina-
tion of damages, which are all supported in the record and 
unrefuted and correct the judgment of the trial court. This 
Court should award to the plaintiffs the loss of bargain in the 
amount of $277,325.00, the $35,000.00 paid upon the contract, 
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engineering costs incurred as a result of entering into the 
contracts in the amount of $11,716.40, annexation fee in the 
amount of $2,500.00 and the stipulated amount of attorney's 
fees of $9,478.00. 
Plaintiffs, the buyers in this transaction, respect-
fully request the Court to enter its amended judgment in 
accordance with the law and with the evidence. 
Dated and signed this 25th day of June, 1980. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and corrPct 
copies~of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to Jeril B. Wilson, 
Attorney for Defendants and Respondents, 350 East Center, 
Provo, Utah 84601, by placing a copy of same in the u. s. 
Mails, postage prepaid, this 25th day of June, 1980. 
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